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Summary
Background:  Although  the  2009—2010  inﬂuenza  A  (H1N1)  pandemic  was  of  low  sever-
ity  compared  with  other  pandemics  of  the  20th  century,  this  pandemic  was  the  ﬁrst
opportunity  for  countries  to  implement  a real-life  pandemic  response.  The  aim  of  the
project  was  to  review  the  extent  to  which  these  plans  and  planning  activities  proved
useful  and  to  identify  areas  of  pandemic  planning  that  require  further  strengthening.
Methods:  We  randomly  selected  seven  countries  within  the  WHO  European  Region
to  participate  in  a  comprehensive,  qualitative  study  to  evaluate  the  pandemic  pre-
paredness  activities  undertaken  prior  to  March  2009  compared  with  the  subsequent
pandemic  responses  mounted  from  May  2009  onwards.  Research  teams  visited  each
country  and  interviewed  stakeholders  from  health  and  civil  response  ministries,
national  public  health  authorities,  regional  authorities  and  family  and  hospital  doc-
tors.
Results:  The  following  six  consistent  themes  were  identiﬁed  as  essential  elements  of
successful  pandemic  preparedness  activities:  communication,  coordination,  capac-
ity  building,  adaptability/ﬂexibility,  leadership  and  mutual  support.  Regarding
future  pandemic  preparedness  activities,  an  emphasis  on  these  areas  should  be
retained  and  planning  for  the  following  activities  should  be  improved:  commu-
nication  (i.e.,  with  the  public  and  health  professionals);  coordination  of  vaccine
procurement  and  logistics;  ﬂexibility  of  response  and  hospital  surveillance.
Conclusions:  Pandemic  preparedness  activities  were  successfully  undertaken  in  the
WHO  European  Region  prior  to  the  2009  pandemic.  These  activities  proved  to  be
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n  2008,  the  United  Kingdom  Government  published
 national  risk  register  for  the  ﬁrst  time.  The  reg-
stry identiﬁed  types  of  risks  from  hazards  and
alicious threats  faced  by  the  United  Kingdom  and
ssigned  their  relative  importance;  the  document
as updated  in  2010.  Based  on  a  composite  rating
f relative  likelihood  and  relative  impact,  a  human
nﬂuenza  pandemic  was  rated  the  greatest  threat  to
nited Kingdom  security  in  2008  and  2010.  Notably,
he 2010  assessment  speciﬁed  that  ‘‘the  outbreak
f Swine  Flu  (i.e.,  inﬂuenza  A/H1N1)  in  2009  did  not
atch the  severity  of  the  worst-case  scenario  that
e planned  for  and  is  not  necessarily  indicative  of
uture pandemic  inﬂuenzas  . .  . the  Swine  Flu  pan-
emic does  not  change  the  risk  of  another  pandemic
merging  (such  as  a  pandemic  H5N1)  or  mean  that
he severity  of  any  future  pandemics  will  be  the
ame as  the  2009  H1N1  outbreak’’  [1].  Thus,  pan-
emic inﬂuenza  is  still  regarded  as  a  major  national
hreat  to  civil  and  social  order  and  one  that  should
e guarded  against  through  national  planning  and
nternational  cooperation  [2,3].
The  European  Centre  for  Disease  Prevention  and
ontrol  (ECDC)  and  the  World  Health  Organization
WHO) provide  support  to  countries  to  improve
heir national  pandemic  inﬂuenza  preparedness
4—6]. Each  country  publishes  recommendations  for
ational pandemic  control  systems  and  conducts
xpert meetings  and  country  visits  to  improve  the
ational ability  to  manage  an  inﬂuenza  pandemic
7,8]. The  broad  aims  of  pandemic  prepared-
ess activities  are  to  reduce  transmission,  case
umbers,  hospital  admissions,  and  deaths,  main-
ain essential  services,  and  reduce  socioeconomic
onsequences  [5].  The  essential  elements  are  as
ollows:  developing,  exercising,  maintaining,  revis-
ng and  planning  for  the  implementation  of  plans  at
ational, regional  and  local  levels  [9].
A major  difﬁculty  has  been  that  most  pandemic
lanning activities  began  either  after  the  emer-
ence  of  highly  pathogenic  avian  inﬂuenza  A  (H5N1)
n humans  in  1997  or  after  its  re-emergence  in  late
003 [10].  Pandemic  plans  generally  were  based
n scenarios  that  were  extrapolated  from  the  pan-
emics  of  the  20th  century  and  the  possibility
hat avian  inﬂuenza  virus  H5N1,  which  carries  a
t
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 appropriate  for  the  response  provided  in  2009.  Never-
lso  emerged  regarding  speciﬁc  areas  of  under  planning
f  the  surveyed  countries.
ziz  University  for  Health  Sciences.  Published  by  Elsevier
atality  rate  of  60%  in  its  current  form,  may  evolve
nto a  pandemic  virus  [11].  Until  the  2009  pan-
emic, there  had  been  no  event  against  which
andemic preparedness  activity  could  be  tested.
ccordingly,  it  was  unclear  which  pandemic  pre-
aredness  activities  would  be  the  most  and  least
mportant  during  an  actual  response  to  a real
vent. Similarly,  there  was  a lack  of  understand-
ng concerning  whether  speciﬁc  elements  were
nderdeveloped  (i.e.,  underplanned)  or  absent.
o address  this  underplanning,  we  evaluated  the
sefulness  of  pre-pandemic  preparedness  activi-
ies compared  with  their  perceived  usefulness  when
ounting a response  to  the  2009  H1N1  pandemic  in
he WHO  European  Region.  Speciﬁcally,  we  aimed
o identify  areas  in  which  planning  was  beneﬁcial
ersus areas  less  useful  or  underdeveloped.
ethods
 qualitative  investigation  was  performed  to  iden-
ify major  themes  associated  with  the  usefulness
f pandemic  preparedness  activities.  Fifty-three
ountries within  the  European  Region  were  assigned
y the  WHO  Regional  Ofﬁce  for  Europe  to  one
f three  broad  categories  that  represented  those
hat had  ‘well-advanced’  pandemic  plans  by  March
009 (i.e.,  category  A,  10  countries),  those  ‘less
ell-advanced’  (i.e.,  category  B,  31  countries),  and
hose that  had  plans  still  directed  mainly  toward  an
vian inﬂuenza  A  (H5N1)  zoonotic  threat  (i.e.,  cat-
gory C,  12  countries).  The  allocation  of  countries
nto  these  categories  was  performed  conﬁdentially
y the  Inﬂuenza  and  other  Respiratory  Pathogens
eam of  the  WHO  Regional  Ofﬁce  for  Europe  and
ased on  its  sustained  dialogue  with  the  Mem-
er States  and  a series  of  pandemic  preparedness
ssessments  and  country  visits  [12—14].
An  independent  statistician  assigned  an  a priori
rder to  approach  the  countries  based  on  stratiﬁed
andom sampling  within  the  three  categories.  We
eceived a  list  of  six  countries  to  contact  initially
two per  category)  and  a list  of  six  additional  coun-
ries to  contact  as  second  and  third  choices  if  any
ountry from  the  primary  list  declined  to  partici-
ate. By  applying  this  procedure,  we  selected  six
ountries  for  participation,  along  with  Denmark,
288  A. Hashim  et  al.
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DFigure  1  Map  of  Europe  and  Central  Asia  high
which  hosts  the  WHO  Regional  Ofﬁce  and  unilat-
erally  agreed  to  act  as  a  pilot  country.  Of  the  six
countries  initially  approached  in  March  2010,  ﬁve
agreed and  one  declined;  the  declining  country  was
replaced by  a  second-choice  country  assigned  dur-
ing the  randomization  process.  The  six  countries
that agreed  to  participate  were  as  follows:  Arme-
nia, Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Germany,  Portugal,
Switzerland,  and  Uzbekistan  (Fig.  1).  In  addition,
Denmark  agreed  to  be  included  as  a  seventh  country
after it  became  apparent  that  the  pilot  did  not  stim-
ulate radical  changes  to  the  methodology  or  details
of the  interview  guide.
Representatives  from  the  following  stakehold-
ers of  each  participating  country  were  interviewed
separately: the  ministry  of  health  (MOH),  ministry
of civil  emergency  response  (CER)  or  equivalent,
national public  health  authority  (NPHA),  sub-
national  government  tier  (SNG),  and  primary  and
secondary  healthcare  workers  (HCW),  as  shown  in
Table 1.
These  stakeholders  were  selected  because  they
represented  the  minimum  required  administrative
levels in  the  country,  as  recommended  in  WHO
pandemic preparedness  guidance  (pre-2009).  We
used semi-structured  interview  guides  based  on
open-ended  questions  to  gather  data.  The  interview
guides  were  stakeholder-speciﬁc  but  contained
F
ﬁ
ping  the  seven  countries  selected  for  the  study.
ommon  key  questions  that  covered  the  planning
rocess,  implementation  of  pandemic  prepared-
ess activities  before  the  pandemic  and  use  of the
lan during  the  pandemic  response.  The  interview
taff was  recruited  from  the  University  of  Notting-
am, WHO  Regional  Ofﬁce  for  Europe,  ECDC,  and
ember  State  experts;  all  were  speciﬁcally  trained
or the  project.  All  interviews  were  recorded  and
ranscribed.  The  English  language  was  used  in  the
nterviews  in  four  countries;  Russian  was  used  in
wo countries  and  the  local  language  was  used
n Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Consecutive  transla-
ion was  the  method  used  during  the  interviews  in
on-English-speaking  countries.  The  national  gov-
rnments agreed  to  participate  in  the  study,  and
fﬁcial representatives  were  nominated  by  their
espective  governments  as  interviewees.  As  such,
he study  protocol  lies  outside  the  scope  of  Insti-
utional  Review  Board  consideration;  interviewees
rovided information  as  part  of  their  ofﬁcial  roles
nd not  as  patients  or  volunteers.  A  full  description
f the  protocol  is  available  online  [15].
ata analysisollowing  each  country  visit,  the  recorded  audio
les were  transcribed  and  were  subsequently  word-
rocessed.  Afterward,  researchers  listened  to  the
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Table  1  Number  of  stakeholders  (persons)  interviewed  by  participating  countries.
Country  Stakeholder  organisation
MOH NPHA CER  SNG  Primary  HC  Secondary  HC
Armenia  5  7  6  4  7  3
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  4  6  6  4  6  4
Denmark  1  6  0  8  1  1
Germany  5  6  3  4  3  2
Portugal  5  7  7  4  5  2
Switzerland  5  6  2  4  5  4
Uzbekistan 5 1 3  4  1  5
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aTotal 30 40
les  to  ensure  that  the  transcripts  were  precisely
ranscribed to  preserve  the  meanings  of  stake-
olders’ words.  After  scrutinizing  and  editing  the
ranscripts,  the  word  ﬁles  were  imported  into
Vivo  8  software  for  qualitative  analysis  [16,17].
he analyses  were  based  on  grounded  theory,
hich is  an  inductive  methodology  that  allows  the
esearcher  to  develop  a  theoretical  interpretation
f the  general  features  of  a  topic  through  data
nalysis [18].  Initially,  the  transcripts  were  read
horoughly  to  identify  recurring  speciﬁc  themes
iscussed by  the  stakeholders.  The  upper-level  or
ore general  themes  (e.g.,  communication)  were
erived from  the  research  questions,  whereas  the
ore speciﬁc  themes  (e.g.,  coordination  groups)
ere identiﬁed  from  multiple  readings  of  the  raw
ata when  recurrent  regularities  appeared  in  the
ata. As  the  analysis  progressed,  themes  identiﬁed
s related  were  organized  into  discrete  categories
nd subcategories,  which  led  to  the  emergence
f the  conceptual  framework.  Finally,  a  hierarchy
f themes  and  sub-themes  emerged,  from  which
he major  themes  were  as  follows:  communication,
oordination,  capacity-building,  mutual  support,
eadership  and  ﬂexibility.  The  themes  in  the  Results
ection are  rank  ordered  by  their  prominence  during
he interviews.  The  speciﬁc  quotes  are  identiﬁed
y the  stakeholder  and  preparedness  category;
owever, in  accordance  with  our  agreement  with
articipating  Member  States,  speciﬁc  country  iden-
ities were  not  revealed.
esults
ommunication
ommunication  was  the  most  important  and
ecurring  theme  mentioned  during  the  interviews
ecause all  countries  identiﬁed  that  effective  com-
unication  strategies  were  both  important  for
anaging  infectious  disease  outbreaks  and  proved
n
i
w
a31  28  21
o  be  essential  elements  of  the  response  to  the  pan-
emic (H1N1)  2009.
ulti-sectoral  participatory  meetings
‘The  plan  was  developed,  and  it was  done  together
ith  (diverse)  stakeholders,  and  we  had  continuous
eetings,  on  a  regular  basis,  weekly,  to  get  every-
ne on-board,’’  commented  an  MOH  stakeholder,
ategory A.
‘Did you  participate  in  the  national  planning  for
andemic inﬂuenza?  No,  it  was  done  at  a national
evel,’’  commented  a  sub-national  stakeholder,
ategory B.
Category A  countries  reported  frequent  and  reg-
lar meetings  during  pandemic  planning,  including
onferences,  videoconferences,  round-table  dis-
ussions, and  workshops,  which  were  held  both
t national  and  sub-national  levels.  Central  and
ub-national  representatives,  including  secondary
ealthcare  workers,  actively  participated,  as  did
he representatives  of  pharmaceutical  and  vac-
ine companies,  the  military,  other  governmental
mergency response  organizations  and  nongovern-
ental organizations.  These  multi-sector  activities
ere also  maintained  throughout  the  implemen-
ation and  response  phases  of  the  2009  pandemic
tself. In  contrast,  countries  in  categories  B and  C
eported less  frequent  meetings  and  less  partici-
ation  of  sub-national  stakeholders  in  the  planning
rocess  at  the  national  level.
he plan  dissemination  channels  and  target
roups
ountries in  categories  A  and  B  reported  dis-
eminating their  pandemic  plans  to  all  health
nd non-health  stakeholders  involved  in  the  plan-
ing and  response  via  national  or  sub-national
nﬂuenza pandemic  web  sites.  National  plans
ere also  actively  disseminated  through  e-mail
nd regular  mail  during  their  development  and
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implementation.  The  targeted  groups  were  pri-
marily comprised  of  the  following:  sub-national
government,  primary  and  secondary  healthcare
settings and  non-health  institutions.  In  turn,  sub-
national stakeholders  disseminated  plans  locally  to
the public,  the  media,  and  scientiﬁc,  political,  reli-
gious and  academic  organizations  via  ﬁlm,  reports,
bulletins  and  other  publications.  In  contrast,  cat-
egory C  countries  distributed  their  plans  to  the
health  sector  only.
Inter-  and  intra-sectoral  communication
difﬁculties
‘‘In our  region,  GPs  are  not  familiar  with  the  inter-
net and  rarely  use  e-mails,  and  we  needed  to
increase  their  awareness  during  the  response,  but
that was  not  possible,’’  commented  an  HCW  stake-
holder, category  C.
Although  multi-sectoral  meetings  were  consid-
ered to  be  highly  effective,  there  was  a  consistently
identiﬁed lack  of  primary  care  input  during
pandemic planning,  implementation  and  the  even-
tual response  in  all  countries.  This  problem  was
reported  at  both  national  and  sub-national  levels.
Failed communication  channels  between  primary
care  professionals,  mainly  general  practitioners
(GPs or  family  physicians),  and  other  regional  and
national levels  contributed  to  this  problem.  Impor-
tant communication  channels,  such  as  the  internet,
phone  and  e-mails,  were  necessary  for  efﬁcient  and
rapid delivery  of  information  concerning  pandemic
preparedness  and  response.  However,  in  category
C countries  and  certain  category  B  countries,  some
GPs lacked  internet  and  e-mail  access  at  work,  and
they complained  of  the  high  volume  of  information
received from  the  sub-national  level.  Furthermore,
healthcare workers  in  countries  in  categories  A  and
B reported  deﬁciencies  in  the  risk  communication
between  the  national  authorities  and  healthcare
workers regarding  vaccine  efﬁcacy  and  safety.
Communication  to  the  public
National governments  in  category  A  launched
pandemic-related  television  programs  and  cam-
paigns, which  were  reported  to  have  increased
awareness among  the  public  during  planning.  In
addition,  in  countries  in  categories  A  and  B,  spe-
ciﬁc actions  were  considered  to  have  facilitated  risk
communication  to  the  public  during  the  response;
these actions  included  thoroughly  educating  the
public about  pandemic  inﬂuenza  symptoms  and
personal  hygiene.  These  actions  were  executed
through media  campaigns,  such  as  the  distribution
g
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f ﬂyers  and  posters  in  hospitals  and  primary  health
linics.
oordination
he  second  most  common  theme  identiﬁed  was
hat of  coordination.  Interviewees  reported  that
ptimized  pandemic  response  outcomes  could  be
nvisaged when  essential  activities  were  coordi-
ated in  a  seamless  fashion.  The  below-mentioned
ey sub-themes  were  considered  to  have  a great
mpact on  coordination  prior  to  and  during  the  pan-
emic.
oordination  groups
‘Inter-sectoral  coordinating  groups  were  very
mportant  because  this  was  actually  the  ﬁrst  time
hey met  these  people,  different  stakeholders,  and
his was  one  of  the  important  ways  to  get  things
orking .  .  . this  made  it  possible  to  solve  other
roblems that  they  hadn’t  solved  before  (by  work-
ng together),’’  commented  an  MOH  stakeholder,
ategory A.
Countries  in  categories  A  and  B  established  a  des-
gnated coordination  group  within  the  national  level
hat was  responsible  for  pandemic  planning  and
esponse.  This  group  was  responsible  for  deﬁning
he command  and  control  structure  and  collect-
ng and  disseminating  information  in  the  planning
nd response  phase.  This  presence  of  this  group
as not  reported  in  category  C  countries.  At  the
ub-national  level,  all  countries  had  their  own
nﬂuenza-coordinating  committees  at  a  regional
evel.  Category  C  countries  stated  that  more
nter-regional coordination  was  needed  for  these
ommittees  to  implement  their  pandemic  plans
etter.  In  countries  categorized  A  and  B,  the  coor-
inating groups  responsible  for  civil  response  were
omprised  of  private  businesses,  armed  forces,  and
he MOH,  NPHA  and  regional  representatives.  How-
ver, in  category  C  countries,  these  committees
ere solely  constituted  by  Ministry  of  Interior  ofﬁ-
ials, and  there  was  no  inter-sectorial  coordination.
seful coordination  activities
ational and  sub-national  respondents  consistently
eported  that  coordination  activities  prior  to  the
andemic  reduced  panic  during  the  response
hase. Category  B  appointed  an  implementation
roup responsible  for  plan  implementation  moni-
oring.  Communication  platforms  and  cooperation
etween national  and  regional  tiers  and  across  sec-
oral boundaries  were  considered  important  for
As
d
C
T
w
b
C
A
c
w
e
p
t
t
o
i
b
c
s
d
d
c
c
t
p
C
i
E
p
A
g
n
r
c
d
e
w
o
p
r
n
d
m
M
I
a
m
i
G
d
‘
w
t
w
w
s
g
t
N
m
t
a
p
C
d
A
i
d
m
w
f
g
S
g
m
d
E
t
p
d
u
e
f
i
d
F
a
‘
t
d
c
t
n
o qualitative  analysis  in  seven  countries  
eamless  and  effective  coordination  during  the  pan-
emic response  across  all  countries.
apacity-building
he  below-mentioned  key  sub-themes  associated
ith capacity-building  were  considered  important
y all  countries.
apacity-building  actions  prior  to  the  pandemic
ll countries  reported  that  staff  training  was  a
rucial pre-pandemic  requirement.  This  training
as speciﬁc  to  a  generally  low  baseline  knowl-
dge concerning  potential  differences  between
andemic and  seasonal  inﬂuenza.  Category  A  coun-
ries dedicated  expert  groups  that  were  available
o provide  guidance  to  the  revision  and  updating
f national  plans  and  related  guidelines;  this  step
ncreased  the  potency  of  country-speciﬁc  capacity-
uilding  activities  supported  by  the  plan.  All
ountries  reported  the  lack  of  established  hospital
urveillance  networks  prior  to  the  pandemic;  this
eﬁciency  had  a  negative  impact  during  the  pan-
emic response  when  critical  data  from  secondary
are were  unavailable  or  unreliable.  Category  A
ountries  reported  that  more  planning  regarding
he ﬂexibility  of  advanced  vaccine  agreements  with
harmaceutical  companies  was  required.  Category
 countries  mentioned  poor  planning  for  ICU  capac-
ty and  that  more  ICU  resources  were  required.
xercises  associated  with  pandemic
reparedness
ll of  the  countries,  excluding  one  from  cate-
ory B,  described  undertaking  exercises  at  the
ational,  sub-national  or  hospital  levels  to  build
esponse  capacity.  These  included  desktop  and
ommand  post  exercises  based  on  simulated  pan-
emic scenarios.  The  lessons  identiﬁed  from  these
xercises  were  poorly  perceived  by  the  intervie-
ees in  category  C  countries  who  highlighted  a lack
f proper  systems  to  provide  feedback  and  incor-
orate  changes.  However,  category  A  countries
eported speciﬁc  lessons  concerning  the  coordi-
ation of  vaccine  logistics  because  they  required
istribution  and  delivery  management  improve-
ents.
utual supportnternational  and  national  support  can  be  obtained
nd provided  in  different  forms.  The  below-
entioned key  sub-themes  were  considered
mportant.
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uidance  and  document  support  before  and
uring pandemic
‘I went  to  London  and  Spain  to  see  how  things
ere working  there.  I went  to  the  Health  Protec-
ion Agency  and  the  Department  of Health.  We
ent  together  with  the  person  from  a  region,  and
e shared  the  experience,’’  commented  an  NPHA
takeholder,  category  B.
Pandemic  preparedness  support  provided  by
uidance  documents  was  considered  highly  essen-
ial for  good  pandemic  preparation  and  response.
ational stakeholders  received  guidance  docu-
ents  and  checklists  from  international  organiza-
ions that  provided  support  for  pandemic  planning
nd preparedness.  Category  C  countries  were  sup-
orted by  the  WHO,  ECDC  and  United  States
enter for  Disease  Control  and  Prevention  pan-
emic  guidelines.  However,  countries  in  categories
 and  B  were  less  dependent  on  support  from
nternational organizations.  The  WHO  guidance
ocuments for  pandemic  planning,  clinical  manage-
ent and  methodological  and  technical  guidelines
ere widely  used  by  national  stakeholders  as  a
ramework  to  develop  country-speciﬁc  plans.  This
uidance continued  after  the  start  of  the  pandemic.
ub-national  tiers  in  all  countries  relied  mainly  on
uidelines,  frameworks,  strategy  and  policy  docu-
ents provided  by  their  national  tiers  but  also  made
irect use  of  the  support  materials  from  the  WHO,
CDC and  neighboring  countries.  Category  B  coun-
ries reported  that  the  ability  to  access  pandemic
lans from  other  countries,  such  as  the  United  King-
om, Canada,  and  proximal  neighbors,  was  also
seful to  address  inconsistencies.  In  contrast,  cat-
gory A  countries  reported  poor  support  and  delays
rom the  WHO  and  other  international  organizations
n providing  real-time  clinical  and  epidemiological
ata during  the  pandemic  response.
inancial support  for  pandemic  preparedness
ctivity
‘There  is  no  ﬁnance  allocated  for  development  of
he plan.  It  is  done  free  of  charge.  It  is  part  of  our
ay-to-day  job,’’  commented  an  NPHA  stakeholder,
ategory  B.
The countries  in  categories  B  and  C  stated
hat preparation  of  the  plan  and  guidelines  was
ot ﬁnancially  supported  by  international,  national
r sub-national  government  bodies  and  was  con-
idered a  routine  activity  to  be  included  within
xisting budgets;  only  category  A  countries  funded
xpert  groups  to  prepare  their  national  plans.
owever, all  countries  allocated  funds  for  plan
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implementation  and  inter-pandemic  phase  activ-
ities, such  as  personal  protective  equipment,
vaccines and  antiviral  drugs.
Leadership
The  following  were  issues  and  activities  were
considered important  for  pandemic  preparedness
leadership:
Sectoral lead  roles  during  pandemic
preparedness  planning
‘‘You  can  have  well-directed  communication  if  you
have a  clear  leadership,  that  way  you  can  respond
rapidly  . .  .  but  otherwise,  it  would  be  a  mess,’’  com-
mented  an  MOH  stakeholder,  category  A.
The MOH  and  public  health  authorities  were
the principal  institutes  for  pandemic  prepared-
ness planning.  The  business  continuity  planning
for non-health  services  was  led  by  the  Ministry
of the  Interior  in  category  C  countries  and  the
NPHA and  MOH  countries  in  categories  A  and  B.
Sub-national  planning  leadership  varied  between
countries,  with  the  MOH  and  NPHA  assuming  lead-
ership roles  in  category  C  countries,  and  regional
government mostly  leading  sub-national  pandemic
preparedness  actions  in  countries  in  categories  A
and B.  Moreover,  countries  in  categories  A  and  B
reported  on  the  effective  role  of  the  sub-national
government on  leading  hospital  planning  activities
in terms  of  on-going  follow-up  and  introducing  leg-
islation to  require  hospital  preparedness.
Important leadership  functions
‘‘There was  a  plan  approval  process  . . .  in  which
everybody (from  diverse  sectors)  had  the  opportu-
nity to  give  input  and  make  ﬁnal  comments  so  that
the plan  was  (representative)  not  of  a  single  per-
son but  of  a  whole  group,’’  commented  an  NPHA
stakeholder,  category  A.
Countries  in  categories  A  and  B  stated  that
strong political  commitment  at  the  national  and
sub-national  levels  combined  with  efﬁcient  gov-
ernmental  approval  processes  through  orders  and
decrees  were  useful  factors.  A  gap  was  reduced
between public  health  practitioners  and  medical
doctors when  public  health  authority  leaders  were
clinical ofﬁcers;  this  decision  resulted  in  improved
coordination of  pandemic  preparedness  planning
activities.  In  contrast,  category  A  countries  crit-
icized the  leading  role  of  the  WHO  during  the
response and  reported  that  the  WHO  overreacted
to the  2009  pandemic  and  that  there  should  have
s
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een  more  ﬁeld  investigation  prior  to  announcing
hase 6.  Moreover,  category  A  countries  requested
dditional  transparency  regarding  scientiﬁc  advice
hat was  provided.
daptation/ﬂexibility
he  below-mentioned  points  demonstrate  aspects
f pandemic  preparedness  activities,  plans  and
uidelines  in  which  ﬂexibility  was  necessary  for
ountries  to  respond  effectively  to  the  2009  pan-
emic.
daptation  of  pandemic  plans
ational authorities  were  forced  to  adapt  their
lan framework  to  the  context  of  the  2009  pan-
emic, which  was  milder  than  that  which  had  been
nticipated  and  planned.  The  issue  of  mass  vac-
ination  logistics  was  the  recurrent  problematic
heme encountered  at  national  and  sub-national
evels that  had  vaccine  access.  Countries  in  cat-
gories A  and  B  with  national  plans  that  stated
hat the  entire  population  would  be  vaccinated  had
o modify  their  strategies  to  that  of  vaccinating
nly those  groups  at  risk  of  severe  disease  once  it
as established  that  the  pandemic  was  milder  than
ad been  expected.  This  modiﬁcation  indicated,
or example,  that  the  responsibility  for  the  vacci-
ation campaign  devolved  from  the  national  level
o the  primary  healthcare  sector.  Hence,  vaccina-
ion strategies  were  rewritten  during  the  pandemic.
oreover,  case  deﬁnition  and  treatment  protocols
ere  regularly  adapted  to  prevailing  clinical  cir-
umstances;  many  hospitals  adapted  their  own  plan
nto a  more  concise  and  user-friendly  version.
ifﬁculties  encountered
‘Well,  it  really  doesn’t  matter  which  declared
hase we  are  in,  we  had  to  take  measures  that  were
ppropriate  and  are  based  on  the  actual  situation
in the  country]  and  not  in  Mexico  or  elsewhere,’’
ommented an  HCW  stakeholder,  category  A.
The lack  of  ﬂexibility  in  WHO  phase  criteria
nd the  countries’  national  plans  was  a recurrent
ssue throughout  the  pandemic.  Measures  applica-
le to  each  pandemic  phase  were  overly  speciﬁc
nd focused  on  the  global  situation  to  be  relevant
ithin  an  individual  country.  Stakeholders  at  the
ational level  from  countries  in  categories  A  and
 adjusted  their  response  according  to  the  actual
ituation,  did  not  adhere  to  the  WHO  phases  and
equested  a  more  ﬂexible  guidance  document  for
uture pandemic  planning  from  the  WHO.  In  con-
rast, category  C  countries  followed  the  WHO  phase
A  qualitative  analysis  in  seven  countries  293
Table  2  Summary  of  good  practices  and  gaps  identiﬁed  from  the  study.
Theme  Successes  Challenges
Communication Raising  public  awareness
Multi-sectoral  meetings
Plan  dissemination
Communication  primary  HCW
Poor  risk  communication
Information  overload
Coordination  Implementation  group
National  and  sub-national  cooperation
Sub-national  coordination  group
Inter-regional  coordination
Vaccine  procurement  and
logistics
Capacity  building Training
Expert  groups
Exercises
Hospital  surveillance
More  ﬂexibility  vaccine
contracts
ICU  equipment
Mutual  support Guidance  documents
Finance  implementations
International  organizations
Finance  planning  activities
WHO  data  sharing
Leadership  Political  commitment
Plan  approval  process
Sub-national  leading  on  hospital  planning
WHO leading  role  criticized
Adaptability/ﬂexibility  Adapting  treatment  protocol
Adapting  response  to  the  actual  situation
Lack  of  ﬂexibility  WHO
phases
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puidelines  precisely.  Table  2  provides  a  summary  of
he good  practices  and  shortcomings  in  all  of  the
ountries  that  participated  in  the  study.
iscussion
he  2009  pandemic  was  the  ﬁrst  pandemic  to  have
ccurred  in  the  era  of  modern  pandemic  plan-
ing. Although  many  evaluations  of  the  pandemic
esponse have  now  been  performed  or  are  under-
ay [19],  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  this  is
he only  evaluation  that  has  explicitly  focused  on
he usefulness  of  pandemic  preparedness  activity
lanning, rather  than  the  response  itself.  We  delib-
rately used  a  randomized  sampling  framework  and
ccepted social  science  methodologies  [16—18]  to
aximize the  rigor  of  our  approach.
ore principles for pandemic preparedness
espite  differences  in  the  level  of  their  prepared-
ess prior  to  2009  and  considerable  inter-country
eopolitical  diversity,  we  identiﬁed  several  con-
istent themes,  which  highlight  the  areas  of  good
ractice  and  areas  that  required  further  in  the
ftermath  of  the  2009  pandemic.  These  themes
ere distributed  across  six  major  recurring  and
nterdependent  themes.  These  ﬁndings  suggest
hat it  is  possible  to  deﬁne  a  set  of  core  prin-
iples for  effective  pandemic  preparedness,  i.e.,
R
o
p
eVaccination  policy
olitical  buy-in;  multi-sectoral,  cross-disciplinary
pproaches;  expert  technical  input  (i.e.,  from  indi-
iduals and  supranational  organizations);  the  use  of
xercises and  simulations;  staff  training;  and  public
wareness  and  strong  leadership.  Our  ﬁndings  sug-
est that  the  infrastructure  to  support  these  core
rinciples’  were  established  prior  to  the  2009  pan-
emic in  category  A  countries  and  facilitated  the
esponse  to  pandemic  (H1N1)  2009.  However,  it  was
qually clear  from  our  analysis  that  a  subset  of
andemic  preparedness  activities  did  not  work  well
r were  underdeveloped  when  the  2009  pandemic
ccurred in  category  B  and  C  countries.  The  lack
f ﬂexibility  in  plans  across  all  countries  that  lim-
ted their  practical  relevance  to  a milder  pandemic
cenario and  poor  linkage  of  WHO  phases  to  prac-
ical action  thresholds  within  individual  countries
hose  pandemic  timings  varied  considerably,  are
oth illustrative  of  a general  preoccupation  with
he possibility  of  a  severe  H5N1  avian  inﬂuenza
hreat. Paradoxically,  however,  the  H5N1  threat  has
ot decreased,  and  it  would  be  unwise  to  modify
lans to  respond  to  a  mild  pandemic  event.
eﬁnement of future pandemic
reparedness  activitiesegarding  the  reﬁnement  and  further  development
f pandemic  preparedness  activities  in  the  post-
andemic  era,  a number  of  prominent  themes
merged from  our  analysis.  Attention  has  already
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been  drawn  to  a  large  number  of  communication
difﬁculties  that  occurred  during  the  2009  pandemic
[20].  Our  data  identiﬁed  problematic  communica-
tions between  central  health  planners  and  frontline
healthcare  workers,  as  reported  by  the  latter.  In
particular,  difﬁculties  in  accessing  guidance,  infor-
mation overload  and  a  lack  of  involvement  in
pandemic  planning  were  all  highlighted.  These  data
suggest that  planning  for  internal  communication
within the  health  sector  requires  development  in
future pandemic  planning.  Public  views  may  be
important  and  worth  studying,  but  these  observa-
tions  are  outside  of  the  scope  of  the  present  study.
Problems  with  vaccine  delivery  logistics  in  late
2009 and  early  2010  have  been  highlighted  in  other
reports [21,22]  but  were  again  consistently  high-
lighted  by  our  data  in  category  A  and  B  countries.
Such deﬁciencies  could  be  addressed  by  improved
operational planning  (i.e.,  as  opposed  to  strategic
planning)  and  the  use  of  simulations  and  exercises,
especially at  a  sub-national  level.
It is  widely  recognized  that  in  the  early  stages
of the  2009  pandemic,  accurate  clinical  and  epi-
demiological  data  on  the  emerging  situation  in
Mexico and  other  early-affected  countries  were
sparse.  Accurate  data  on  community  cases  were
sparse  [23],  and  reported  data  mainly  from  hastily
assembled  case  series  on  hospitalized  patients  with
severe H1N1  disease  were  lagging  [24—27].  Para-
doxically,  the  heath  impact  of  the  2009  pandemic
was mostly  observed  in  secondary  care  settings.  Our
data illustrate  widespread  concerns  that  hospital
surveillance  for  severe  acute  respiratory  infection
(SARI) had  been  inadequately  addressed  during  the
pandemic planning  process  and  required  urgent
remedial development.
This novel  approach  to  pandemic  evaluation,
which explores  the  utility  of  previous  pandemic  pre-
paredness  activities  compared  with  the  eventual
pandemic  response,  has  identiﬁed  core  principles
for successful  pandemic  preparedness  activities,
as determined  by  participating  Member  States,
to have  been  important  success  factors  during
the 2009  pandemic  response.  In  addition,  we
have highlighted  areas  in  which  further  develop-
ment is  clearly  needed  in  the  post-pandemic  era.
Our methodology,  based  on  accepted  social  scien-
tiﬁc principles,  could  be  replicated  in  other  WHO
regions  and  utilized  after  a  future  pandemic.
Study limitationsNotably,  the  political,  environmental,  geograph-
ical, economic,  social/cultural  or  circumstantial
context under  which  these  thematic  domains  were
presented  during  each  pandemic  stage  could  have
p
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etermined  how  pandemic  preparedness  activities
n the  Member  States  were  executed.  Because
he organizational  structure  of  the  national  and
ub-national  systems  within  each  Member  State
iffered,  similar  activities  could  have  had  various
ffects  and  been  grouped  differently,  depending
pon the  context  in  which  they  were  found.  In  addi-
ion, category  C  countries  perceived  this  study  as
n inspection  process.  Therefore,  these  countries
ttempted  to  portray  themselves  in  a  positive  light
ecause  they  may  have  been  afraid  of  being  judged
or an  inappropriate  action  or  lack  of  an  action,
hough this  was  explicitly  not  within  the  study
emit. Moreover,  the  level  of  public  health  infras-
ructure  varied  greatly  across  the  seven  countries,
.e., from  rudimentary  to  sophisticated.  Therefore,
he amount  of  data  from  which  relative  sever-
ty can  be  judged  may  have  been  different  across
ountries,  and  a  low  number  of  conﬁrmed  cases
r deaths  may  reﬂect,  in  certain  cases,  a  lack  of
ccurate  reporting  rather  than  a lack  of  infections.
n addition,  our  methodology  was  based  on  the
remise  of  selecting  seven  countries  in  a  stratiﬁed
andom  manner  by  their  pre-pandemic  prepared-
ess activity  level  (i.e.,  low,  medium,  and  high)  and
ot on  the  pandemic  impact  in  2009.
In  summary,  our  study  reveals  that  the  effort
nd resources  invested  in  pandemic  planning  in
he WHO  European  Region  prior  to  the  2009  pan-
emic were  generally  worthwhile  and  contributed
o a  successful  response.  Nevertheless,  as  the
omentum  for  a  pandemic  is  re-established  in
he post-pandemic  period,  greater  attention  should
e paid  to  communication,  response  ﬂexibility,
accine procurement  and  logistics  and  hospital
urveillance.
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